Abstract Crupi et al. (2008) offer a confirmation-theoretic, Bayesian account of the conjunction fallacy-an error in reasoning that occurs when subjects judge that Pr(h 1 & h 2 |e) > Pr(h 1 |e). They introduce three formal conditions that are satisfied by classical conjunction fallacy cases, and they show that these same conditions imply that h 1 & h 2 is confirmed by e to a greater extent than is h 1 alone. Consequently, they suggest that people are tracking this confirmation relation when they commit conjunction fallacies. I offer three experiments testing the merits of Crupi et al.'s account specifically and confirmation-theoretic accounts of the conjunction fallacy more generally. The results of Experiment 1 show that, although Crupi et al.'s conditions do seem to be causally linked to the conjunction fallacy, they are not necessary for it; there exist cases that do not meet their three conditions in which subjects still tend to commit the fallacy. The results of Experiments 2 and 3 show that Crupi et al.'s conditions, and those offered by other confirmation-theoretic accounts of the fallacy, are not sufficient for the fallacy either; there exist cases that meet all three of CFT's conditions in which subjects do not tend to commit the fallacy. Additionally, these latter experiments show that such confirmation-theoretic conditions are at best only weakly causally relevant to the presence of the conjunction fallacy. Given these findings, CFT's account specifically, and any general confirmation-theoretic account more broadly, falls short of offering a satisfying explanation of the presence of the conjunction fallacy.
Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy
Psychologists today face the challenge of explaining the presence of certain widespread reasoning errors in humans. Perhaps the most well known example of such errors is the "conjunction fallacy." This fallacy occurs when a person ranks a conjunction h 1 & h 2 more probable than one of its conjuncts h 1 in light of some information (or "evidence") e; that is, in such cases, one affirms that Pr(h 1 & h 2 |e) > Pr(h 1 |e). The most famous example of the conjunction fallacy appears in Tversky and Kahneman (1983) ; in this experiment, participants are presented with the following information:
(e) Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.
Participants are then asked to judge-in light of (e)-which of the following two statements is more likely: (h 1 ): Linda is a bank teller.
Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.
A large majority of participants-85% in Tversky and Kahneman (1983) -respond that the conjunction h 1 & h 2 is more likely than the single conjunct h 1 , thus committing the conjunction fallacy.
A recent trend in attempts to explain the presence of the conjunction fallacy has been to look to Bayesian confirmation theory, a field of study that uses the mathematics of probability in order to analyze the notion of evidential support. As part of the analysis of this notion, Bayesian confirmation theory has proposed a host of quantitative measures of the confirmatory support given to an hypothesis h by some evidence e. Table 1-taken from Crupi et al. (2008) -lists some of the proposed measures of confirmation. All of these measures are functions of a probability distribution over statements h and e that output a unique real number that is positive whenever Pr(h|e) > Pr(h), negative when Pr(h|e) < Pr(h), and zero whenever Pr(h|e) = Pr(h). 1 According to the recent trend in work on the conjunction fallacy, experimental participants' judgments in conjunction fallacy cases may actually be tracking relations of evidential support as analyzed and measured by Bayesianism. 2 Importantly, in the Linda case as summarized above, while it is fallacious to believe that h 1 & h 2 is more probable than h 1 in light of e, it is not fallacious-and indeed seems quite rationalto believe that e confirms (or lends evidential support to) the conjunction h 1 & h 2 to a greater extent than it does the single conjunct h 1 . The general common thesis among advocates of this recent trend then is that such rational and valid judgments of evidential support underlie participants' responses in conjunction fallacy experiments.
In this vein, Crupi et al. (2008, hereon, " CFT") offer a clever and detailed recent account of the conjunction fallacy. They write, "a unified account of probabilistic Carnap (1950) , Eells (1982) R (h, e) = ln Pr(h|e) Pr(h) Keynes (1921) , Milne (1996) L (h, e) = ln Pr(e|h) Pr(e|¬h) Good (1950) , Fitelson (2001) Carnap (1950) S (h, e) = Pr (h|e) − Pr(h|¬e) Christensen (1999), Joyce (1999) 
otherwise Crupi et al. (2007) fallacious judgments in classical conjunction problems could be found on the basis of the notion of confirmation: participants may in fact have a tendency to rely on assessments of confirmation when judging probabilities" (p. 188). CFT are clear that their account does not excuse humans from the charge that they tend to commit a genuine fallacy; experimental participants do make "a genuine error given the experimental task" (p. 188). 3 However, they maintain that "the fallacious probability judgments experimentally observed are typically guided by sound assessments of confirmation relations, meant in terms of contemporary Bayesian confirmation theory" (p. 182).
In spelling out the unique details of their account, CFT offer the following three "common traits" or "conditions" for "standard conjunction problems" (where c stands in for any of the Bayesian measures of confirmation listed in Table 1 e) ; thus, if an experimental case meets conditions (i) and (ii), then independent of one's choice of Bayesian confirmation measure, the conjunction h 1 & h 2 will be better confirmed by e than the conjunct h 1 . In the subset of such cases that also satisfy condition (iii), CFT posit that participants will tend to commit the conjunction fallacy: "the hypothesis is that, on conditions (i)-(iii), most participants may depart from the relevant probabilistic relationship between Pr(h 1 & h 2 |e) and Pr(h 1 |e) because of the perception that c( p. 188) . In this way, CFT's detailed confirmation-theoretic account of the conjunction fallacy specifies "a set of conditions on which the conjunction fallacy effect is expected" (p. 192) .
Toward the end of their article, CFT write, "A limitation of the present account is, of course, that we are not presenting new empirical evidence in favour of it. We do think, however, that relevant experimental inquiries can be devised" (p. 194). The current paper presents the results of some initial experimental inquiries. More specifically, three experiments investigate the status of CFT's three conditions. The following three questions have motivated my research on this topic and shape the remainder of this paper:
(1) Are CFT's conditions necessary for the conjunction fallacy? (2) Are CFT's conditions sufficient for the conjunction fallacy? (3) Does there exist a causal relationship between the satisfaction of CFT's three conditions and the human tendency to commit the conjunction fallacy, and if so, how strong is this relationship?
Experiment 1 shows that CFT's conditions are indeed not necessary for the conjunction fallacy; however, the results of this experiment also point to the possibility of a strong causal connection between these conditions and the fallacy. Experiments 2 and 3 reveal that CFT's conditions-and in general, the condition c(
also not sufficient for the conjunction fallacy; additionally, these latter two experiments show that, if there does exist a causal relationship between these conditions per se and the fallacy, it is a very weak one. These findings support the conclusion that CFT's account specifically, and any general confirmation-theoretic account more broadly, falls short of offering a fully satisfying explanation of the presence of the conjunction fallacy.
e : John is walking along in the woods when he spots a black animal. h 1 : The animal that John spots has feathers. h 2 : The animal that John spots is a raven.
In this case then, the conjunction h 1 & h 2 is confirmed by e to a greater extent than h 1 alone is confirmed by e, although CFT's condition (iii) is not met.
There exist more interesting ways that one can achieve the confirmation relation c(h 1 & h 2 , e) > c(h 1 , e) apart form CFT's conditions. In fact, this inequality can be present in cases that either do not meet condition (i) or do not meet condition (ii). In the latter case, although condition (ii) is broken-and thus e is negatively (if at all) correlated with h 2 either unconditionally or conditionally on h 1 -the confirmation relation may still robustly be attained if h 1 is negatively correlated with e to a large enough degree (see Appendix 1, Case 1). In the former case, although e is positively correlated with h 1 -and thus condition (i) is not met-it may still be the case that, given a very strong positive correlation between e and h 2 , the extent to which the conjunction h 1 & h 2 is confirmed by e is robustly greater than the extent to which h 1 alone is confirmed by e. In such situations, it might even be the case that h 1 and h 2 are positively correlated-and thus condition (iii) is not met-and the confirmation relation will still follow robustly (see Appendix 1, Case 2). This possibility raises the interesting question of whether the conjunction fallacy might be present in such cases. If CFT's specific conditions are necessary for the conjunction fallacy, then people should not tend to commit the fallacy in these cases.
Experiment 1 investigated this issue via the following setup:
e : Linda participates in anti-war protests, votes Democrat, and subscribes to a popular liberal magazine. h 1 : Linda is a poet. h 2 : Linda is a feminist.
Participants (N = 56; age: mean = 19.8, SD = 1.76; 41.4% male) were all drawn from undergraduate courses offered through the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh. Through a series of "Background Information" questions, it was determined that no participants had any significant formal mathematical training. When asked which of two statements was more likely to be true in light of information e, participants were forced to choose between "(a) Linda is a poet" and "(b) Linda is a feminist poet." The order of answer choices was randomized to eliminate any potential ordering effects. In order to gauge participants' degrees of belief pertaining to CFT's three conditions, I asked participants three questions (see Appendix 2 for all survey questions).
My predictions for this experiment were as follows: The majority of participants would express the belief that the case breaks from CFT's conditions. I surmised that most participants would hold this belief either because of a judged positive correlation between e and h 1 , because of a judged positive correlation between h 1 and h 2 , or because of both of these. Most importantly, I predicted that, in spite of the fact that participants would tend to express belief that CFT's conditions are not met by this case, many participants would still commit the conjunction fallacy.
These predictions were borne out in the experimental results: 56.9% of participants explicitly expressed belief that the case breaks with CFT's conditions in one way or another. Out of these 32 participants who expressed such belief, 37.5% still committed the conjunction fallacy. On the other hand, out of the 24 participants who expressed the belief that the probe meets CFT's conditions, 70.8% committed the fallacy (see Fig. 1 ).
These results reveal at least two important findings: first, there exists a clear significant difference in susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy between those participants who believe that the case meets CFT's conditions and those who do not χ 2 (df = 1, N = 56) = 6.1; p < .05 . The former group has an apparently much stronger tendency to commit the fallacy then the latter. This finding lends strong Secondly however, these results show that there exist cases in which people still commit the conjunction fallacy in spite of the fact that they believe one or more of CFT's conditions are not met by a case. While it is true that participants who believed that CFT's conditions were met by this case were more likely to make the fallacy then those who did not, nearly 40% of participants who explicitly expressed belief that this case broke with CFT's conditions committed the conjunction fallacy nonetheless. Thus, this experiment constitutes strong evidence that CFT's conditions are not necessary for the conjunction fallacy.
Experiments 2 and 3: CFT's conditions apart from the conjunction fallacy
Bayesian confirmation theory pays little heed to an hypothesis's prior probability per se when deciding whether that hypothesis is or is not confirmed by some evidence. This is an attractive feature since it seems appropriate to affirm that an hypothesis either is or is not confirmed by some evidence regardless of how probable that hypothesis is apart from the evidence. To be more precise, it is only once one compares posteriors to priors in some way that priors have some say in whether or not an hypothesis is confirmed in the Bayesian sense. Given this feature of Bayesian confirmation, it is quite possible for the confirmation relation c( . Experiments 2 and 3 investigated this issue. The setup for these two experiments was identical to that for Experiment 1. Participants were again drawn from undergraduate courses offered through the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh (participants did not overlap between any two experiments). Through a series of "Background Information" questions, it was determined that no participants had any significant formal mathematical training. The order of answer choices was randomized to eliminate any ordering effect. In both cases, I asked participants three questions to gauge their degrees of belief pertaining to CFT's three conditions (see Appendices 3 and 4 for all survey questions).
In Experiment 2 (Appendix 3), participants (N = 20; age: mean = 19.8, SD = .90; 10.0% male) were faced with the following setup:
e : Jenny is planning on trying out for American Idol this upcoming season. h 1 : Jenny's favorite music is opera. h 2 : Jenny will be the next American Idol.
When asked which of two statements was more likely to be true in light of information e, participants were forced to make a choice between "Jenny's favorite music is opera" and "Jenny's favorite music is opera and she will be the next American Idol."
In Experiment 3 (Appendix 4), participants (N = 21; age: mean = 20.6, SD = 2.23; 23.8% male) were faced with the following setup: e : Jim is an occasional purchaser of a mega millions lottery ticket. h 1 : Jim is a scientist. h 2 : Jim will win the multi-million dollar jackpot in the lottery.
When asked which of two statements was more likely to be true in light of information e, participants were forced to make a choice between "Jim is a scientist" and "Jim is a scientist and he will win the multi-million dollar jackpot in the lottery."
My predictions for both of these experiments were as follows: In both cases, participants would tend to agree that CFT's conditions are met-if h 1 (liking opera; being a scientist) would be seen as relevant at all either to e (trying out for American Idol; being an occasional lottery player) or to h 2 (winning American Idol; being a lottery winner), it would be seen as negatively so; also, participants would tend to see a positive correlation between e and h 2 . Most importantly, I predicted that, in spite of this fact, participants would not tend to make the conjunction fallacy in these cases.
Again, all of my predictions were borne out by the experimental results. Pertaining to the "American Idol" case, 75% of participants explicitly agreed that CFT's conditions were met. Out of these participants who expressed such belief, 80% did not commit the fallacy (see Fig. 2 ). Additionally, in the "Lottery" case, 66% of participants agreed that CFT's conditions were met. Out of these participants, 85.7% did not commit the fallacy (see Fig. 3 ). Experiments 2 and 3 thus reveal the following important findings. First, the results of these experiments show that there exist cases in which people do not tend to commit the fallacy in spite of the fact that they believe that all three of CFT's conditions are met. Thus, these experiments constitute strong evidence that CFT's conditions are not sufficient for the conjunction fallacy.
Second, the results of Experiments 2 and 3 lend insight into the question of causal influence between CFT's conditions and the conjunction fallacy. The satisfaction of CFT's conditions might be a cause of the conjunction fallacy even if these conditions are not jointly sufficient for a high fallacy rate. However, if conditions (i)-(iii) are indeed causally linked to the conjunction fallacy, Experiments 2 and 3 show that this link is weak at best: between those participants who believed CFT's conditions were not met by the case and those who believed that they were, the percentage who committed the fallacy rose only slightly from 0 to 20% in Experiment 2 and from 0 to 14.3% in Experiment 3. In these experiments, participants who explicitly note the satisfaction of all three conditions still only rarely commit the fallacy. Both of the findings from Experiments 2 and 3 thus present a challenge to CFT's claim that their conditions (i)-(iii) constitute "a set of conditions on which the conjunction fallacy effect is expected" (p. 192).
Conclusion
Although CFT's account arguably has an initial attractiveness and plausibility, it also manifestly has its limitations in light of these initial experimental inquiries. Via such investigation, I have shown that their conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient for the conjunction fallacy. Additionally, I've argued from the results of Experiments 2 and 3 that if their conditions are causally relevant to the conjunction fallacy at all, they are only weakly so. The satisfaction of these conditions may indeed cause humans fallaciously to rank a conjunction as more probable than one of its constituent conjuncts; however, there exist cases which make it clear that if they do so on their own, it is only to a very weak degree.
The implications of these experiments to recent work on the conjunction fallacy stretch beyond CFT however. It is especially important here to remember the robustness of CFT's thesis. As noted, CFT prove that their conditions (i) and (ii) imply the robust confirmation relation c(h 1 & h 2 , e) > c(h 1 , e)-i.e., regardless of what specific measure of confirmation one chooses. Thus, insofar as subjects tend to agree that conditions (i) through (iii) are met by the cases presented in Experiments 2 and 3, the findings of these two experiments can be critically applied to any account that attempts to explain the presence of the conjunction fallacy by appealing, in general terms or in terms of any specific Bayesian confirmation measure, to the fact that h 1 & h 2 is better confirmed by e than h 1 . In other words, the critical conclusions of Experiments 2 and 3 apply generally to the common thesis held by advocates of the recent confirmationtheoretic trend in accounts of the conjunction fallacy. Consequently, CFT as well as all of their confirmation-theoretic predecessors (see note 2) may be criticized on the charge that their accounts specify conditions for the conjunction fallacy that are not sufficient and at best merely weakly causally relevant. Given these findings, CFT's account specifically, and any general confirmation-theoretic account more broadly, falls short of offering a fully satisfying explanation of the presence of the conjunction fallacy.
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Appendix 1: Robust confirmation outside of CFT's conditions
The purpose of this technical appendix is to verify the claim that one can break with CFT's conditions in various ways and nonetheless achieve the relevant, robust confirmation relation c(h 1 & h 2 , e) > c(h 1 , e) . To show this, it is sufficient to introduce a coherent assignment of probabilities that implies both c(h 1 & h 2 , e) > c(h 1 , e) and the negation of one or more of CFT's conditions. I offer the following two such cases.
Case 1: condition (ii) broken Any probability distribution specifying the following assignments will lead to the result that c(h 1 & h 2 , e) > c(h 1 , e) in spite of the fact that condition (ii) is broken-given that h 2 is not positively correlated with e since Pr(h 2 ) = Pr(h 2 |e) :
Measure D:
Measure R:
Measure L:
Measure C:
Measure S:
Measure Z: (a) This information makes it more likely that Bill will win the lottery (b) This information makes it less likely that Bill will win the lottery (c) This information doesn't affect the likelihood that Bill will win the lottery
